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(Item 121)

Despatched: 18 November 1941. P.M. WASHINGTON

Received: 19 November 1941. P.M. *Foreign Ministry*

Strictly Confidential -- Ambassador's Code

From: Ambassador NOMURA

To: Foreign Minister TOGO

#1133

KURUSU states:

(1)-----According to the views held by Ambassador NOMURA and myself, although the President maintains calm attitude outwardly, we feel that the President possesses keen desire to conclude the U.S.-Japanese negotiation. Now, that just because the other party does not take in whole-heartedly our proposal there is no reason for an immediate conjecture that it is a willingly-delayed policy. Moreover it is most important at this time not to resort to actions that could not be amended afterwards.

(2)-----Through the establishment of the Revised Neutrality Law, etc., the U.S. interests were all the more focused to the Atlantic, and therefore, although they are affirming preparations and determination to fight Japan if compelled to, it seems that they are seeking if possible to maintain security in their back front by negotiating with our country. In both of our interviews, with the President on the 17th and with HULL on the 18th, much emphasis was placed on the question of the Tri-Partite treaty. The reason for their giving more force to their assertion than is usual could be attributed chiefly to the consideration given therein. That is, as an assumption to U.S.-Japanese compromise, the U.S. Government shall give the American public in general, the impression of Japanese-German estrangement. To do this, it is desired that utilization be made regarding U.S.-Japanese joint declaration concerning non-discrimination in trade, or to let Japan participate in the agreement regarding the same question now being negotiated between the U.S. and Britain, or to utilize messages manifesting peaceful aims on the part of JAPAN as suggested by the Secretary of State HULL in our interview of the 18th.

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(3)-----An acute change in the present state of Japanese-German relations is, of course, an impossibility, and in view of the aforementioned conditions, I believe it is most important for our country to give the United States sufficient security possible so that they could all the more concentrate deeply to the Atlantic, thereby enabling us to occupy favourable positions in the international situation that is to arrive after the war, not mentioning our full scale execution of the present Sino-Japanese hostilities. (Part 2) In regard to the question of whether the U.S. and Britain will, or will not turn the point of their swords to us after the present war and start suppressing us, I stated this at the conference on the 17th pointing out the bitter experience our country underwent during after the last World War (I) and bluntly explained the suspicion embraced by a group of our people toward the Anglo-Americans. To this, the President unhesitatingly replied that the new agreement also covers such points. (Cover it all).

(4)-----In view of the present state of affairs in our country's internal situation, I believe there are various difficulties to be met before being able to attain some measures along the lines desired by the United States. For the time being, as a link to fill the lapse in time, it is most desirable that a time limit be set in regard to American-Japanese negotiation and to pave a way through this confronting situation, I think that it is necessary to ask for an assurance to import a set quantity of petroleum and also the rescinding of freezing orders. In my interview of the 18th, I together with Ambassador NOMURA suggested a return to the condition prior to 24 July. As an equivalent to this, I think that the U.S. might not consent with only our B proposal stipulating the non-advancement of our armed forces outside French Indo-China, and our testimony given vague in condition regarding evacuation of troops from French Indo-China, as evidenced by our past negotiation. I suggest that at this time, you will show in advance, some degree of sincerity such as to commence evacuation of troops from Southern French Indo-China.

Now, as there is the question of your instructed time limit, I would like, if possible, to effect immediate disposal of the matter while the President is still in Washington, which I am urgently advising.

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大臣
次官
主計長
秘書長

(總3544)

極秘 館長竹内

東郷外務大臣

野村大使

電信課長 (巻山)

昭和六年五月十八日 辭後 華府發

五月九日 辭後 本省若

(贈) (機)

第一二三號

未稱

(一) 野村大使及次官觀測ニ依、大統領、表面然々不態度ヲ得、
之此、然、日本、文、語、付、其、外、勢、意、有、ト、認、マ、ル、ル、何、事、ニ、先、方、
カ、我、等、軍、事、協、助、ニ、セ、テ、一、致、ヲ、以、テ、直、ニ、要、求、セ、ル、ト、是、斷、取、後、
ノ、事、ヲ、行、動、ニ、出、ル、カ、如、キ、利、下、取、モ、或、ニ、要、ス、ル、所、ナ、リ、

(二) 中、立、法、修、正、成、立、等、キ、條、ノ、米、國、ノ、関、心、ハ、一、層、金、洋、ニ、向、テ、米、國、
ノ、已、ニ、得、得、ル、ハ、持、リ、作、戦、ニ、敢、テ、辭、セ、ル、進、備、受、信、ハ、受、テ、
正、義、不、得、ル、故、ト、一、方、決、テ、背、後、ノ、意、ヲ、得、ル、ト、シ、テ、
ノ、如、ク、一、日、ノ、會、見、ニ、於、テ、大、統、領、十、八、日、ノ、ハ、ル、長、官、ノ、何、モ、三、島、
同、盟、及、約、同、盟、ニ、ノ、志、ヲ、固、シ、テ、決、テ、宣、シ、其、ノ、主、張、強、ク、示、ス、
所、以、之、ト、シ、其、不、道、ノ、思、慮、ニ、出、ル、モ、一、觀、測、ス、即、チ、米、國、ノ、
日、米、不、協、之、前、後、ト、シ、一、般、不、民、民、對、シ、日、獨、非、難、ノ、印、象、ヲ、與、
ニ、カ、為、政、治、通、商、無、主、明、主、義、ニ、因、テ、日、米、協、力、宣、言、受、テ、日、下、米、米、間、
ニ、交、渉、ト、シ、同、一、同、盟、國、ノ、協、力、ニ、依、テ、決、テ、宣、言、シ、テ、一、日、會、見、
ニ、ハ、ル、長、官、ノ、不、受、モ、然、レ、不、可、不、知、其、義、表、明、ト、シ、テ、一、日、會、見、
ニ、ハ、ル、長、官、ノ、不、受、モ、然、レ、不、可、不、知、其、義、表、明、ト、シ、テ、一、日、會、見、
ニ、ハ、ル、長、官、ノ、不、受、モ、然、レ、不、可、不、知、其、義、表、明、ト、シ、テ、一、日、會、見、

(三) 日、獨、不、協、之、前、後、ト、シ、一、般、不、民、民、對、シ、日、獨、非、難、ノ、印、象、ヲ、與、
ニ、カ、為、政、治、通、商、無、主、明、主、義、ニ、因、テ、日、米、協、力、宣、言、受、テ、日、下、米、米、間、
ニ、交、渉、ト、シ、同、一、同、盟、國、ノ、協、力、ニ、依、テ、決、テ、宣、言、シ、テ、一、日、會、見、
ニ、ハ、ル、長、官、ノ、不、受、モ、然、レ、不、可、不、知、其、義、表、明、ト、シ、テ、一、日、會、見、
ニ、ハ、ル、長、官、ノ、不、受、モ、然、レ、不、可、不、知、其、義、表、明、ト、シ、テ、一、日、會、見、

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戰後要求有予之輕之予彼方壓迫之向と来に二無事や問題
三、十六日合談、際本使より前大戦後三於此我之善を経験
述我支部、對並余疑念を齊直に説明せし對文然領(三十三)
協定斯に盡す元全部包含又へきなり (Cover all) 上格

(四) 我支部内情勢、現狀ニ鑑ミ今直米側希望、線沿之何
等措置を得ん三種々困難予に(一)と思考不所差なり其
間、穀米トミテ斯に日本交渉成立三付「多ムリミツ」
ノ張チ希望ミ考へ差當り局面打開、為疎密令解除、地
主皇輸入ノ保障ヲ求ルに要スル(二)と思考之十六日合談、於
野村大使ト是日三番目以前、狀態復歸ヲ示唆シリ此
第十日米側トミテ之方對價三付乙案ノ佛領印度支那以
外武力不進云々條件曖昧ニ佛印撤兵ノ証言ノミニ之故
未交納ノ經過ニ鑑ミ決テ予取服サセル(三)付此際豫メ
南部佛印撤兵開始値ノ誠を思フ事此三番目當りタリ
何分陽訓令「多ムリミツ」ト云有之出來得し八事週大統領
在華中ニ急遽處理ヲ進メ度ヲ三付右三急進言ス(了)

FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 301

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Item 134

To: Ambassador NOMURA in America

From: Foreign Minister TOGO

Despatch No. 43905

Depatched: ²⁰19 November 1941 - 0030 *Drafted: 19, Nov., 1941.*

Telegram No. 800 (Ambassador Code) Very Urgent.

Re my Telegram No. 799

Re paragraph 1 of my telegram No. 780. Southeast Asia and South Pacific includes Dutch Indies and Thailand, but not China.

Re item 2 of paragraph 3, it is desirable that the required quantity be decided upon by agreement of both governments before the signatures are affixed to this present agreement.

Re paragraph 4, please bear in mind that it means the cessation of aid to Chiang by the United States.

Re paragraph 5. Article 2 (my #801) is an important concession we venture to make for the sake of speeding the conclusion of the agreement.

Re paragraph 6. We could not agree to the principle of non-discrimination in trade being applied only to China, as I have stated in my #784.

Re paragraph 7, latter part of item 2. As an explanation of our attitude as expressed in "Japan would decide entirely independently" in case the U.S. should enter the European War, you may point out that the Empire can decide independently as to whether or not there had been an attack, without being bound to the interpretations of the other countries involved in the Tripartite Treaty. You may make it clear that there are no secret agreements in the Tripartite Treaty. (However, you will please withhold your explanation of this item until you see prospects of this agreement materializing).

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電信局 (55)		郵便局	
主 日本郵政大臣 官		主 日本郵政大臣 官	
通 電 送 第 43905 号	宛 在 米 野村大使	海 東 郷 大 臣	
平 成 15 年 11 月 18 日 08 時 30 分 発	件 名	記 録 件 名	
第 1 0 0 号		(館長村田大副長)	

VERY URGENT

往 東京 七 九 九 号 (一 部)

往 東京 七 九 九 号 (一 部)

一、東京 七 九 九 号 (一 部) 太平洋 七 九 九 号 (一 部) 東京 七 九 九 号 (一 部) 東京 七 九 九 号 (一 部)

二、東京 七 九 九 号 (一 部) 太平洋 七 九 九 号 (一 部) 東京 七 九 九 号 (一 部) 東京 七 九 九 号 (一 部)

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